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IN TI-IE SUPPJ'ME ffiURI' OF 'IRE srATE OF lJrAH 
- ----------------------------------
')F ITTAH, 
Plaintiff-Resp::indent, 
Case No. 19,021 
'JS. 
'nCTOR ONTIVEROS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELIANI' 
srA.."'EMENI' OF 'IRE NA'I'IIBE OF 'IRE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Distribution of a Controlled Substance for 
Value, in that on or about the 10th day of June, 1982, in violation of 
58-39-8(1) (a) (ii), the Defendant did distribute for value a controlled 
substance, to wit: marijuana. 
DISPOSITION IN IDWER O'.JURI' 
Defendant was tried by jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, the Honorable DAVID SAM, JUDGE, presiding, on the 12th day of 
January, 1983. The jury found the Defendant guilty as charged. The Court had 
previously ruled on December 1, 1982, that Defendant was not entrapped as a 
matter of law. The Court also denied Defendant's l'btion for Directed Verdict of 
l\cRJital on the 18th day of January, 1983. 
Defendant was sentence<l on the 24th day of February, 1983, to serve 0-5 
'e>ars in the Utah State Prison, but the sentence was stayed and Defendant granted 
orobat ion. 
RELIEF SOUGl'T' ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectful l·.1 requests that the Court r"'vrorc;0 the 'leulict ,1r 
guilty entered in the District Court. 
STATDlEITT OF FACTS 
Approximately two weeks prior to the 10th of ,)une, 1982, the Defendant 
was contacted by a Provo City undercover police officer at his hane in Spring-
ville, Utah. The police officer was accanpanied by an acquaintance of the 
Defendant named Billy and had not previously had any contact with the Defendant. 
The officer had no prior knowledge that Defendant was a drug dealer or involved 
in drugs. ('l'R 16, 28, 36) The purpose for the police officers interest in the 
Defendant was to purchase drugs fran the Defendant. The undercover officer was 
told by the Defendant that he had no drugs and that he didn't sell drugs. Z\t that 
time the officer gave the Defendant a business card with his undercover name and 
two numbers. He indicated that he was a taxi cab driver and he coulci be reached 
at one of the numbers on the card should the Defendant have any cirugs he wanted 
to sell. (TR 37) Following the initial contact with the Defendant, tJie undercover 
officer followed up with two phone calls to the Defendant's hane and three or 
four visits to his apartment each lasting fran twenty to forty minutes on which 
occasions the Defendant was asked to procure drugs for the officer. On each of 
those occasions, with the exception of the last, the Defendant infmmed the 
officer that he didn't have any drugs and he didn't sell drugs. (TR 38-40) The 
Defendant's wife was present during part of the conversations on those occasions 
when the police officer was at the hane of the Defendant anci Mrs. Ontiveros ·.;as 
also the individual who answered the phone on both occasions when the officer 
called. (TR 52-55) At no time during the time period between the initial contar' 
'""'n L'il' undercover [X)l ice officer and the Defendant and the date of June 10, 
1,1 , rJ u1 the Defl'n'1ant ever contact the officer either by telephone or 
1 1 "'twise>. All contact between Defendant and the undercover police officer was 
i11iti3ted by the officer. (TR 30-31, 38) On the 10th of June, the undercover 
officer came to the Defendant's hane in Springville, without any prior 
in11itation, and asked if the Defendant had any drugs to sell. The Defendant had 
sane canpany at hane since the 10th was his son's birthday and asked the officer 
to cane back later. When the officer returned he was invited in and Defendant 
indicated that he still did not have any drugs but that he knew saneone who might 
have sane marijuana for sale. Defendant indicated that he offered to find sane 
drugs for the undercover officer "rrore or less to get him out of my hair". (TR 
41) The Defendant made a phone call and indicated to the officer that the third 
party was willing to sell him a half an ounce of marijuana for forty ($40.00) 
r:x:illars. The Defendant took the officer to the location, received forty dollars 
fran the officer, went into an apartment, brought out one-half ounce of marijuana 
and delivered it to the officer. (TR 20-22, TR 42) There was no evidence that 
the Defendant received any rroney for himself. (TR 28) 
After the marijuana had been exchanged, and on the Wi!r'f back to 
Springville, the parties srroked a joint of marijuana fran the baggie. On their 
arrival at Springville, the Defendant requested the officer to sell him enough 
marijuana for one joint out of the baggie. The officer declined to sell him any 
'llarijuana but did agree to let him take enough out of the bag for one joint. (TR 
il, 42-43) After the sell which occured on the 10th of June, 1982, there were no 
'the>t contacts between the officer or the Defendant until the Defendant was 
arrested on this charge. (TR 43-42) 
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At the close of the StatP's case, the ))pfen1ant male> J :nnt i•'n c,,r 1 
directed verdict based on the argument that thc> Defendant 'lad not: cudc> 3 11 , 1 1 
bution of a controlled substance frx value. (TR 62) The rmti,,n was leniecl h·,, " 
Court. 
.a.RGUMENI' 
POINr I 
'IBE DEFENDANT' WAS ENl'RAPPED BY 'ffiE UNDERCDVER OFFICER. 
The Defendant raised the issue of entraµnent both prior to trial in an 
evidenciary hearing on motion in ccrnpliance with Utah Code Annotated 76-2-303, 
1953 as amended, and at the time of trial. 'l'he Court found there was no 
entrapnent as a matter of law at the time of the evidenciary hearing. 
The present case before the Court, is substantially similar to the 
situation which existed in a previous case decided by this Court in State 
vs. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238. In Kourbelas, the Defendant was engaged in a 
conversation with an undercover agent who first suggested the purchase of mari-
juana from the Defendant, then followed the initial contact with a renewed 
contact and request with approximately five telephone calls to purchase mari-
juana. There was no evidence that the Defendant had previously possessed or 
dealt in the drug prior to the contacts by the officer. The conviction of 
Kourbelas was reversed, the Court finding there was reasonable doubt as to 
whether or not the offense camli tted was a product of the Defendant's initiative 
and desire or was induced by the persistent request of the undercover officer. 
In the present case, there was no evidence that the Defendant had an/ 
prior history of dealing drugs or any evidence that he had even possessed "lruqs 
prior to the officers contact. '1'he officer, after the initial contact, 
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,,, ' ' 11 1P thP Defenc1ant to sell him drugs although the Defendant never at any 
"' trJr to the date of the transaction agreed to do so. l\dditonally, although 
1 rJ<Of Pnrlant had been furnished bo.Q telephone numbers where the officer could be 
,'"ntcicted anrl, in a<ldition, having been infonned that the officer would be 
'•llling to purchase drugs Eran the Defendant, never contacted the officer on any 
x:cas ion concerning the distribution of drugs. All contacts were initiated by the 
officer. The officer never found any drugs or observed any at the Defendant's 
residence. In fa:::t, when the substance of marijuana was actually purchased for 
the officer by the Defendant, the purchase was accanplished through a third party 
and the Defendant requested the officer to sell him a joint for his own use. It 
appears fran this evidence to be clear that the Defendant had no drugs in his 
hane for either use or sale. 
The present case also bears a striking simularity to that of State 
vs. Soroushirn, 571 P.2d 1370. In Soroushirn, the Defendant was charged 
as is the Defendant in the present case, with felony distribution of marijuana 
for 1 alue. The Soroushirn case also involved an undercover narcotics officer 
who befriended a black student who in turn introduced the officer to the 
Defendant. l\s in the present case, the officer had no previous indication that 
the appellant was an individual who YoDuld get involved in selling drugs. In 
the officer took the appellant to a place in town to which he had 
been directed to and gave the appellant twenty ($20.00) Dollars and asked him to 
wt two hags of mariju:ma. The appellant went into the house and returned with 
1 ,,1cls ,md ae livered them to the officer. Approximately eight days later, 
f 1 >l lowing several requests in visits by the officer to the appellant, all 
'lesiqnPc1 to obtain marijuana Eran the aopellant, the appellant again rode with 
-'i-
the officer to the hane of the third party, received fortv ($40.nO) Dol lJr; , , 
the officer and bought tv.D bags of marijuana fran the third party which he 
delivered to the officer. Immediately following the purchase of the first tv.1J 
bags, the officer convinced the appellant to obtain tv.D additional bags Eran the 
same source immediately following the purchase of the first tv.D bags. The 
officer gave the appellant a couple of joints when appellant requested him to do 
so. 
The Court found, based upon the foregoing facts, that Soroushirn did not 
distribute'the substance at all but that the substance belonge<l to the officer 
and it was the officer who made the distribution. The Court stated at 571 
P.2d 1371: 
What is wrong here is that the appellant din not distribute 
the substance at all. It belonged to the officer and it was 
the officer who gave t.'1e appellant a couple of ioints and 
thereby made the distribution. 
The Court was correct in holding that the appellant had been 
entrapped. He manifested no indication of being in the 
marijuana b.Jsiness; but at the importuning of the undercover 
officer, did a::t as aided to buy Eran real seller. There is 
nothing to suggest that the appellant v.Duld have ever dealt 
in marijuana except at the instance of and for the benefit 
of the officer. 
Again, the instant case is not distinguishable Eran the foregoing 
situation. Defendant was introduced to the officer by a friend. The officer 
befreinded the Defendant by visiting at his hane and calling him on the 
telephone. The Defendant did a favor for the officer. The !lDney is supplie<I bv 
the officer and the drug was supplied by a third party. The officer allowec1 t1c 
Defendant to pinch the bag after being requested to sell the Defendant sane of 
the substance, and the officer, prior to contacting the Defendant, had no 
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', it ,,)r1 nr evirlence that the Defendant was engaged in the selling of 
, '"' 1 ·11 lc>rl substances. 1'he only fact which distinguishes the tvio cases, is the 
f'K:t that in the Soroushirn case the Defendant was induced into 
marijuana on three different buys, tvio occuring on the same date whereas in the 
present case, there was only one purchase of marijuana by the Defendant for the 
officer. 
Again, in State vs. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, at 504 this Court stated 
as follows: 
Fran the testirrony induced by the State, the evidence 
establishes as a matter of law that Annette Stubbs induced 
the ccmnission of the offense by methods creating a sulr 
stantial risk that the offense would be camiitted by one 
not otherwise ready to carrnit it. It should be emphasised 
Defendant engaged in conduct perscribed by statute and was 
guilty of a crime. However, his conviction cannot stand 
for the reason the statute condemns the conduct of the 
State in inducing the crime, as a perversion of the proper 
standards or crlministration of criminal law. 
Based oo the facts and the cases cited above, the conviction of the 
Defendant should be reversed by reason of his entrapnent by the undercover 
officer. 
POINI' II 
THE EVIDEN'.:E DID ITTl' SUPPORI' A CXJNVICTION FDR DISTRIBITTION OF A 
CDNI'roLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE. 
1'he Defendant was charged under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
-,H 37-8 (1) (a) (ii) with distributing a controlled substance for value. Under 
';ta Le vs. Soroushirn, supra, the Court found that in fact whether the money 
was provided by the narcotics officer, the drug was delivered to the officer by 
thp Defendant and was the only participation by the Defendant was as an agent 
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for the officer, there had been no distrihution. S71 P.2rl l no ar 1171 
the trial of this matter, this Court '<as consirlerc><l the :ilxw'C'-ment L•)ne<l star:11_, 
in connection with facts in a situation wher'C' the Defendant was also charged 
with distribution of a controlled substance for value for substantiall1 similar 
acts to those performed by Defendant in the present case. Tn State vs. 
Hicken, number 18321, the Court upheld the decision of 
the trial court which dismissed the information against the Defendant on the 
grounds that the Defendant had not engaged in distribution of a controlled 
substance for value but should have been charged with the violation of Section 
58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) for arranging the sale of a =ntrolled substance for value. 
The acts of the Defendant in the Hicken case were that when approached by the 
undercover officer he called a third party and arranged the terms of the sale, 
the price, took the officer to the location of the sale and was present when thE 
drug was transferred for value. 
Additionally, in State vs. Harris, 601 P.2d 922, the Court upheld a 
caiviction of the Defendant for arranging the distribution and providing a 
=ntrolled substance under circumstances similar to the present case and the 
Hicken case. In the Harris case, the Court stated as follows: 
Defendant's second point, that the State failed to prove the 
element of value, is directly contradicted by the evidence. 
It is first pointed out that the Defendant himself did not 
receive any cash for arranging the sale. Tt is clear that 
this is not the intent of this statute. Were it otherwise, 
the arranging of drug sales be perfectly legal, so long 
as it is done gratuitously. The aim of the law is to make the 
arrangement of drug sales unlawful, whether they be profit-
able or not. So far as any claim that seller of the 
substance does not receive value, this is directly contra-
dicted by the testinony of the informant who stated on the 
stand that he paid the twenty-five ($25.00) Dollars issued 
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: 11n by the Vernal City i:>olice in exchange for three bags 
nf 11kl.r ijuana. 
8ase<:l en the foregoing cases, it is respectfully sutmitted that 
'"'fendant's crime, if any, was in arranging the distribution of the controlled 
substance for value under the arranging portion of the statute cited above, 
rather than distributing a controlled substance for value. Whereas in the 
present case, the Defendant had no marijuana for sale, made no m::mey on the 
sale, and acted as the intermediary between the officer and the actual dealer, 
the State should have charged him under the arranging portion of the statute. 
Therefore, his conviction for distribution for value should be reversed. 
OJNCLUSION 
The Defendant's conviction for the crime of distribution of a controlled 
substance for value should be reversed in that the Court or the jury should have 
found that the Defendant was entrapped into ccmnitting the acts which led to his 
arrest and prosecution in this matter. While the job and duties of an under-
cover police officer are difficult, there is a substantial danger that the 
activities of the officer in attempting to induce bonefide drug dealers to sell 
to him may also induce saneone who is not engaged in dealing but who is aware of 
the availability of drugs to engage into activity which he 1>Uuld not otherwise 
have done. In this case, based on the evidence before the Court, it is 
sutmi tted that the Defendant was not engaged in distributing controlled 
S1Jbstances for value and that his involvement with the undercover police officer 
"' tf;is case was initiate<'l by the officer, developed by the officer, and created 
i r, rile uff icer. 
Further, the activities of the Defendant aside fran the entrapnent issue 
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ccnstitute the crime, if any, of arranging the salP nf a 1""4 s"",,,t.·u-ie·· 
rather than a distribution for value of a contrnlle'l suhstance. Tl1e DefPndant 
cannot be convicted for distribution where his sole part ic ipat ion was arranging 
the sale. 
Based en the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that his 
ccnviction in this matter be reversed. 
Respectfully suhnitted this "')'/I_!, day of June, 1983. 
MIGIAEL D. ESPLIN , 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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